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NOTES
TWO WRONGS MAKE A RIGHT:
HYBRID CLAIMS OF DISCRIMINATION
MING Hsu CHEN*
This Note reinterprets and recontextualizes the pronouncement in Employment
Division v. Smith (Smith II) that exemptions from generally applicable laws will
not be granted unless claims of free exercise are accompanied by the assertion of
another constitutional right. It argues that when Arab American Muslims, and
others who are of minority race and religion, bring claims for exemption from gen-
erally applicable laws on the basis of free exercise and equal protection principles,
they ought to be able to invoke Smith II's hybridity exception, thus meriting height-
ened judicial scrutiny and increased solicitude from courts.
INTRODUCTION
Few decisions have provoked courts' and Congress 2 in the
* Copyright © 2004 by Ming Hsu Chen. A.B., Harvard University, 2000; J.D. candi-
date, New York University School of Law, 2004. My thanks to the Asian American Juris-
prudence Seminar, Professor Noah Feldman, Professor Larry Kramer, Dean-Emeritus
John Sexton, and Professor Nelson Tebbe for inspiring this reflection on race and religion.
Thanks also to my peer editors at the New York University Law Review, especially Kelly
Bums, Mike Burstein, Evelyn Sung, Mike Wajda, Aneta Wierzynska, and Steve Yuhan for
transforming it into publishable form. My deepest gratitude extends to my husband
Stephen, who is my most devoted partner in securing equality and liberty for all minorities,
and to our families.
1 In Employment Division v. Smith (Smith II), Justices O'Connor and Blackmun wrote
scathing critiques of Justice Scalia's majority opinion for its interpretation of free exercise
jurisprudence. See 494 U.S. 872, 891 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 907-09
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Three years later, Justice Souter vigorously disavowed Smith
//'s holding: "[Tihe [hybrid] distinction Smith draws strikes me as ultimately untenable."
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 566-67 (1993)
(Souter, J., dissenting).
2 Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in order "to
restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder
and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially
burdened" and "to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is sub-
stantially burdened by government." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1)-(2) (2000) (citations
omitted). In the landmark decision of City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court held that Con-
gress lacked authority to enact the RFRA under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and that the RFRA no longer furnished a cause of action against state governments. See
521 U.S. 507, 511, 519 (1997). Though the issue is not yet settled in the federal courts, most
circuit courts have assumed that the RFRA remains enforceable against the federal gov-
ernment. See Mary L. Topliff, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 135 A.L.R. FED. 121 (1996 & Supp. 2003) (collecting
and analyzing federal cases arising under RFRA). Congress has since enacted the
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manner of Employment Division v. Smith (Smith II). 3 The decision
has been characterized as "illogical," 4 "untenable," 5 and "incompat-
ible with our Nation's fundamental commitment to individual relig-
ious liberty. ' 6 Smith II ushers in an era of free exercise jurisprudence
devoid of strict scrutiny7 except in "hybrid situations" where free
exercise claims are joined by colorable claims arising under another
part of the Constitution.8 Under the hybridity exception, free exercise
exemptions from neutral laws in fact may be preserved, even in the
absence of discriminatory intent.9 However, there is no further elabo-
ration of hybridity in Smith H or in subsequent Supreme Court deci-
sions. As a result, Smith H's hybridity doctrine has puzzled judges,
with the predictable consequence being that lower courts have applied
the doctrine inconsistently10 and infrequently."
Rather than resurrect the rage of critics of Smith II, this Note
argues that the theory of hybridity introduced in Smith II is an
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, which mandates the use of strict
scrutiny for free exercise cases that involve infringements on religion from land-use laws
and laws regarding institutionalized persons in prisons, hospitals, retirement homes, and
nursing homes. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b) (2000). Also, eleven state legislatures have
passed their own versions of RFRA legislation. See RFRA REBORN AT THE STATE
LEVEL, at http://www.religioustolerance.org/rfra2.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2004) (discussing
laws passed in Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Texas).
3 494 U.S. 872.
4 Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993).
5 Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 567 (Souter, J., dissenting).
6 See Smith 11, 494 U.S. at 891 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
7 Id. at 883 ("In recent years we have abstained from applying the Sherbert test
(outside the unemployment compensation field) at all.").
8 Id. at 885 ("We conclude today that the sounder approach, and the approach in
accord with the vast majority of our precedents, is to hold the test inapplicable to such
[free exercise] challenges.").
9 See Lukumi Babalu Aye, in which the Court declared intentional discrimination on
the basis of religion to violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. 508 U.S.
at 533 ("[I]f the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their
religious motivation, the law is not neutral, and it is invalid unless it is justified by a com-
pelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest." (citation omitted)).
10 For example, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits require a "colorable claim of infringe-
ment." Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 706 (9th Cir. 1999);
Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir. 1998). In contrast, the
First and D.C. Circuits have determined that companion rights must be independently
viable constitutional claims in order to be hybridized with a free exercise right. See EEOC
v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer
Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995). The Sixth Circuit denounced the notion of
hybrid rights as "illogical." See Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993).
11 See, e.g., Kissinger, 5 F.3d at 180 (showing court's reluctance to apply hybrid rights
doctrine); see also infra note 31.
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appropriate response to the unique social reality of dual minorities.12
Specifically, this Note provides a theoretical justification for hybridity,
lacking in the spare language of the Smith II decision, by looking to
intersectionality theory. Lower courts mostly have applied the
hybridity doctrine in the joinder of free exercise with other First
Amendment rights. In keeping with the illustrative dicta in Smith II,
this Note argues that dual minorities such as Arab American Muslims
ought to be able to join their rights to free exercise with constitutional
rights originating under other clauses, including the Equal Protection
Clause's right to nondiscrimination, in order to obtain heightened
judicial protection. Not only does this Note contend that hybridity is
justifiable jurisprudentially and normatively, but it also claims that
hybridity maps a useful legal strategy for dual minorities.
Part I describes Smith H's implications for free exercise and
introduces the confusion and criticism that surround it and the
hybridity doctrine. Part II draws on intersectionality theory to rein-
terpret the meaning of hybridity.13 It simultaneously offers a theoret-
ical justification for the doctrine of hybridity (namely,
intersectionality) and a doctrinal hook for intersectionality theory
(namely, hybridity). Part III explores the ramifications of this reinter-
pretation and applies the newly reinterpreted doctrine of hybridity to
cases involving dual minorities whose claims are premised on both
racial and religious marginalization. While the theory of hybridity is
intended to apply broadly, for illustrative purposes this Note focuses
on the intersection of race and religion. The overlapping natures of
these social identities illuminate the consonant policies of the Free
Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses and provide a context for the
theory with contemporary relevance-Arab American Muslims'
assertions of hybrid rights in the wake of September 11.
12 Throughout this Note, the term "dual minority" is used to refer to individuals pos-
sessing two or more characteristics of identity that traditionally are disfavored or disadvan-
taged. While the paradigmatic example of this phenomenon may be race and gender, this
Note focuses primarily but not exclusively on the situation of racial and religious minori-
ties. It takes as its primary focus recent examples of claims asserted by Arab Americans of
Muslim faith. While recognizing that not all Arab Americans are Muslim and vice versa,
the example is drawn for its contemporary relevance. Moreover, the term "Arab Amer-
ican Muslim" is used as shorthand for the dual minority category encompassing both racial
and religious characteristics, even as it understates the religious diversity of Arab Ameri-
cans and the racial diversity of American Muslims.
13 Intersectionality theory asserts that dual minorities confront structural disparities
under the law. See infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text. The theory is based on the
outcomes of actual litigation brought by dual minority plaintiffs, though it has not been
established to a degree of statistical significance. This Note bases its assumption that dual
minorities are currently at a legal disadvantage on intersectionality theory and conse-
quently on the assumptions upon which that theory is based.
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As is the case of every sociolegal argument, the arguments
advanced below inherently rely on values and assumptions that the
reader may or may not endorse. On its own terms, the Note offers a
conceptually coherent and strategically useful rendering of Smith II to
those who may confront this breed of distinctive but highly significant
claims.
I
FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE IN EMPLOYMENT
DIVISION v. SMITH
Separate cases culminating in the Smith II decision involved the
claims of Alfred Smith and Glen Black, who were fired from their
jobs with a drug rehabilitation center because they ingested peyote, a
hallucinogenic drug, for sacramental purposes at a ceremony of the
Native American Church.14 Their applications for unemployment
compensation were denied under a state law disqualifying employees
discharged for work-related "misconduct."15 Holding that the denials
violated respondents' First Amendment free exercise rights, the
Oregon Court of Appeals reversed those determinations. 16 On
appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed.' 7 The U.S. Supreme
Court vacated the judgment and remanded for a determination of
whether the controlled substance law of Oregon proscribed sacra-
mental peyote use. 18 The Oregon Supreme Court held that sacra-
mental peyote was not exempted from the state law prohibition,19 but
it then pronounced the prohibition invalid under the Free Exercise
14 Smith 11, 494 U.S. at 874. Oregon law prohibits the knowing or intentional posses-
sion of a controlled substance unless the substance has been prescribed by a medical practi-
tioner. OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(4) (2001). The law defines a controlled substance as a
drug classified in Schedules I through V of the Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21
U.S.C. §§ 811-812 (2000). As compiled by the State Board of Pharmacy, Schedule I con-
tains the drug peyote, a hallucinogen derived from the plant lophophora williamsii lemaire.
OR. ADMIN. R. 855-080-0021(3)(v) (1988).
15 Smith H, 494 U.S. at 874.
16 See Black v. Employment Div., 707 P.2d 1274 (Or. App. 1985); Smith v. Employment
Div., 709 P.2d 246 (Or. App. 1985).
17 See Smith v. Employment Div., 721 P.2d 445 (Or. 1986). The Oregon Supreme
Court held that the denial of benefits was impermissible because Smith's peyote use was
irrelevant to the resolution of his constitutional claim. According to the court, the purpose
of the misconduct provision under which Smith had been disqualified was not to enforce
the State's criminal laws, but to preserve the financial integrity of the compensation fund,
and was unconstitutional since such a purpose is inadequate to justify the burden that dis-
qualification imposed on respondents' religious practice. Id. at 450-51.
18 See Employment Div. v. Smith (Smith I), 485 U.S. 660, 671-72, 674 (1988).
19 See Smith v. Employment Div., 763 P.2d 146, 148 (1988) (holding that Oregon
statute "makes no exception for the sacramental use" of drugs).
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Clause.20 The U.S. Supreme Court, in a 5-4 majority opinion
authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, contradicted the Oregon Supreme
Court, holding instead that the Free Exercise Clause permits the State
of Oregon to prohibit sacramental peyote use and thus to deny unem-
ployment benefits to persons discharged for such use.
21
A. Smith II's Holding and Its Consequences for Free Exercise
In his opinion for the majority, Justice Scalia reasoned that a state
would be "'prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]"' 22 in violation
of the Clause if it sought to ban the performance or abstentions of
physical acts-such as assembling for worship, participating in sacra-
mental use of bread or wine, or abstaining from certain foods or
modes of transportation-only when they are engaged in these acts
for religious reasons, or only because of the belief they display.
23
However, he reasoned that the right of free exercise does not relieve
an individual of his obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law
of "general applicability" that incidentally forbids the performance of
an act that one's religious belief requires. 24 This is true even if the law
is not directed specifically at religious practice and is otherwise consti-
tutional as applied to those who engage in the specified act for non-
religious reasons.25
The Court contended that the respondents' claim for a religious
exemption from the Oregon law could not be evaluated under the
balancing test set forth in the line of cases following Sherbert v.
20 Id.
21 See Smith 11, 494 U.S. at 890 ("Because respondents' ingestion of peyote was prohib-
ited under Oregon law, and because that prohibition is constitutional, Oregon may, consis-
tent with the Free Exercise Clause, deny respondents unemployment compensation when
their dismissal results from use of the drug.").
22 Id. at 877 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I).
23 Id.
24 See id. at 879 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879)). In
Reynolds, the Court rejected a claim that criminal laws against polygamy could not be
constitutionally applied to those whose religion encouraged it. 98 U.S. at 166-67. See also
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring) (rejecting claim that
regulatory law compelling payment of Social Security taxes is constitutionally required to
make exemption for Amish employer whose faith prohibits participation in governmental
support programs); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461-62 (1971) (rejecting claim
that Selective Service System violates free exercise by conscripting persons who opposed
war on religious grounds); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961) (upholding
Sunday closing laws against claim that they burden religious practices of persons whose
religions compel them to refrain from work on other days); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 159, 166, 170-71 (1944) (permitting custodian to be prosecuted under child labor
laws for using her children to dispense literature in streets notwithstanding her religious
motivation).
25 Compare the intentional discrimination cases discussed in Smith H, see 494 U.S. at
879-80, with those elaborated supra note 24.
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Verner,26 whereby governmental actions that substantially burden a
religious practice must be justified by a "compelling governmental
interest. ' 27 In lieu of strict scrutiny, the Court proceeded to evaluate
the case under rational basis review.28
B. Smith II's Hybridity Exception
In support of its core holding, the majority opinion harmonized
free exercise jurisprudence by distinguishing Smith H from preceding
cases that permitted seemingly similar exceptions: "The only deci-
sions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars applica-
tion of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated
action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections. 
'
29
The Court reasoned that in contrast to the above-described situation,
"[the present case does not present such a hybrid situation, but a free
exercise claim unconnected with any communicative activity or
parental right."' 30 These two sentences from the Smith H decision
have given rise to a vast body of literature and litigation over the
requirements for a "hybrid rights" claim, in which a claimant may
establish a violation of the Free Exercise Clause by showing that the
challenged governmental action compromises both the right to free
26 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963) (observing government may not regulate religious
beliefs as such, but rather may regulate conduct that poses "substantial threat to public
safety, peace, or order").
27 Smith 11, 494 U.S. at 883-84 (noting rejection of Sherbert test in Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S: 439, 441-42, 452-53 (1988), in which Court
declined to apply Sherbert test to government's logging and road construction activities on
lands used for religious purposes by several Native American tribes); Bowen v. Roy, 476
U.S. 693, 708-09 (1986) (rejecting Sherbert test in analysis of federal statutory scheme
requiring benefit applicants and recipients to provide Social Security numbers); Goldman
v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504, 506-07 (1986) (rejecting application of Sherbert test to
military dress regulations forbidding wearing of yarmulkes).
28 See Smith 11, 494 U.S. at 885-86 & n.3 (distinguishing use of compelling government
interest standard in case of racial discrimination and free speech violations from incidental
religious discrimination). The Court reasoned that the Sherbert test was developed in the
particular context of unemployment compensation eligibility rules, which lent itself to indi-
vidualized governmental assessment reasons for the relevant conduct, thus permitting an
assessment of motive and potentially discriminatory intent. Though Smith II also involved
unemployment compensation, the Court said the Sherbert analysis was inapplicable to an
across-the-board criminal prohibition on a particular form of conduct. Id. at 883-84.
Noting that it approved the use of the compelling interest test in other contexts, the Court
held that in the context of free exercise such a test would produce "a private right to ignore
generally applicable laws." Id. at 886.
29 Id. at 881 (emphasis added).
30 Id. at 882.
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exercise of religion and a companion right arising under another part
of the Constitution.
31
Despite repeated opportunities to clarify its intent, the Supreme
Court has yet to expound on the meaning of hybrid rights. Most
lower courts, noting that every case the Court cited in Smith II com-
bines a free exercise claim with another First Amendment claim, have
applied the doctrine only in cases where a free exercise claim is made
in conjunction with another First Amendment claim.32 But on its face,
the language used by the Court to describe hybridity does not limit
hybridity to the joinder of claims originating in the First Amendment,
and there is no obvious or logical reason why it should be so limited.
Based on the language of Smith II, a free exercise claim plus a com-
panion right arising under a separate part of the Constitution (such as
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment) ought to
suffice for a hybridity exception.33 This reinterpretation and recontex-
tualization of the hybridity doctrine speaks to the current climate of
increasing claims by religious and racial minorities against the govern-
ment.34 The theoretical insights and normative arguments proffered
are not necessarily limited to religious and racial minorities. How-
ever, focusing on the claims raised by these particular dual-minority
groups illustrates a broad phenomenon with greater clarity and
concreteness.
II
A REINTERPRETATION OF HYBRIDITY DOCTRINE
Noting the ambiguity of the Court's oblique reference to
hybridity in Smith II, this Part sets forth an alternate interpretation of
the hybrid rights exception to free exercise. Part II.A explains
31 The Sixth Circuit in Kissinger v. Board of Trustees expressed bewilderment at the
notion that the Free Exercise Clause could be violated only if other constitutional rights
were implicated. See 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993). Additional cases challenging hybrid
rights are collected in Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, What Constitutes "Hybrid Rights"
Claim Under Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 163 A.L.R.
FED. 493, 511-12 (2000).
32 See, e.g., Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299,
1304 (11th Cir. 2000) (establishment clause); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455,
460 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (establishment clause); Salvation Army v. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, 919
F.2d 183, 200 (3d Cir. 1990) (free speech).
33 Compare cases asserting non-First Amendment companion rights to Smith II. See
Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiff did not allege
hybrid rights claim because claim of infringement of right to interstate travel was merit-
less); Am. Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 961 F.2d 1405, 1408 (9th Cir. 1991)
(rejecting hybridity claim because of insufficient constitutional protection afforded to right
to employ).
34 See, for example, cases referenced in Miller, supra note 31, at 511-12.
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traditional understandings of hybridity. Part II.B explains intersec-
tionality theory in order to highlight the contribution that such a
theory may make to understanding hybridity. Part II.B.1 demon-
strates how the core insight of intersectionality can be of use to those
trying to understand Smith H's hybridity doctrine. Part II.B.2 demon-
strates mainstream acceptance and support for the style of interpreta-
tion espoused.
A. Traditional Theories of Hybridity
Many commentators who have reflected on the hybridity doctrine
presume that it functions by aggregating the cumulative effect of two
or more partial constitutional rights with one sufficient constitutional
claim.35 In this spirit, lower courts interpreting the Smith II decision
have split on the degree of sufficiency required for each partial claim
to obtain the desired cumulative effect, with some arguing that a
viable claim is necessary 36 and others claiming that a merely colorable
claim is required. 37 Some commentators allege that multiple claims
"signal" impropriety, or the perception thereof, arguing that for this
reason the quantity of claims asserted bears directly on the court's
estimation of the seriousness of the constitutional wrong. 38 Each of
these formulations of hybridity evinces a classic assumption that
35 See, e.g., Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexual Rights
Legislation, Public Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 393 (1994).
36 See, e.g., Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995).
37 See, e.g., Miller, 176 F.3d at 1207; Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165
F.3d 692, 705 (9th Cir. 1999); Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th
Cir. 1998). While the focus of this Note is not to settle the matter of whether hybrid claims
need to be viable or merely colorable, for the sake of the analysis that follows, this Note
presumes the position taken by a majority of courts and commentators that hybrid claims
merely need to be colorable. Presuming the opposite would not alter the reasoning or
conclusions in this Note.
38 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. An alternative interpretation of hybridity
not addressed in this Note is known as signaling theory. The signaling theory of hybridity
interprets the Free Exercise Clause as providing a platform from which to send a message
that a particular law is so flawed as to be of dubious constitutional value and, as such,
requires a compelling state interest for it to be sustained. The idea behind this approach is
that when facially neutral statutes infringe both a free exercise right and another substan-
tive provision of the Constitution, the legitimacy of the act deservedly is cast into doubt.
See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 999-1000 (1990). For further discussion, consider the
related notion of expressive harms:
[E]xpressive theories tell actors-whether individuals, associations, or the
State-to act in ways that express appropriate attitudes toward various sub-
stantive values. In one well-known version, the State is required to express
equal respect and concern toward citizens.... Expressivism is thus an internal
account of existing normative practices, but one with sufficient critical capacity
to exert leverage over those practices and to indicate where they ought to be
reformed.
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claims joined in a lawsuit under conventional rules of civil procedure
must be evaluated independently of one another before being aggre-
gated so that each claim presumably succeeds or fails without regard
to the other claims asserted. 39 The notion that hybridity may compen-
sate for the inadequacy of severed claims by affording them cumula-
tive effect understandably offends this mode of legal reasoning.4°
B. A Reinterpretation of Hybridity
The assumption that claims must be disaggregated is itself a juris-
prudential principle subject to evaluation. This Note posits an alter-
native interpretation of hybridity drawn from intersectionality theory
that obviates the apparently serious concerns described in the pre-
vious Section.
1. Intersectionality Theory
Intersectionality theory posits that overlapping, independently
sufficient claims of discrimination effectively prevent the vindication
of either claim.41 As a result, say intersectionality theorists, the law
disadvantages dual minorities who assert claims premised on multiple
rights. Accordingly, the law requires corrective action to achieve true
equality on behalf of dual minorities.
Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1504 (2000).
39 For example, Rule 18(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a
party asserting a claim to relief "may join, either as independent or as alternate claims, as
many claims.., as the party has against an opposing party." FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a). Case
law interpreting Rule 18 and related joinder provisions presume the importance of the
claims arising out of the same nucleus of operative facts. See United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (discussing meaning of "cause of action" and federal courts'
pendent jurisdiction).
40 For example, in a simple lawsuit over an automobile accident, a claim sounding in
tort law may be brought alongside a claim sounding in contract law in a single lawsuit.
Most likely, the tort claim would be measured against a wholly different standard of proof,
with wholly separate evidence presented, from a claim sounding in contract arising out of
the same transaction or occurrence. Consequently, it is entirely foreseeable that the con-
tract claim may succeed even if the tort claim fails. Even if the factual record developed on
one issue is appended or judicially noticed with regard to the other, the outcome of one
claim does not directly dictate the outcome of the other.
41 Two prominent intersectionality theorists include New York University Law Pro-
fessor Paulette Caldwell and U.C. Berkeley, Boalt Hall Professor Angela Harris. See gen-
erally Paulette M. Caldwell, Proceedings of the 1999 Annual Meeting, Association of
American Law Schools Section on Employment Discrimination Law: Is There a Disconnect
Between EEO Law and the Workplace?, 3 EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 131, 161-65
(1999); Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and
Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365 (1991); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990). See also supra note 13 for a discussion of the
empirical data and social realities on which this assumption is based.
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Take Rogers v. American Airlines,42 in which a black woman
claimed that she was disparately impacted by a commercial airline's
policy prohibiting flight attendants from wearing a cornrow hairstyle.
She will have trouble proving discrimination given the airlines' reten-
tion of black men (militating against race discrimination) and white
women (militating against gender discrimination). 43 Similarly, an
African American woman may be denied the ability to serve as a class
representative of either women or black people in a discrimination
suit, even though she is fully female and fully black, because she is
adjudged insufficiently representative of the majority of women or the
majority of black people; she may also have trouble making out a
claim under one or more statutes. 44 Based on these sorts of cases,
intersectionality theorists conclude that the problem of double differ-
ence creates a "matrix of oppression" that assures less judicial protec-
tion than would result if the individual possessed only one minority
trait or the other.
45
42 527 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Rogers relies on Carswell v. Peachford Hos-
pital, which upheld an employer's dismissal of an employee for wearing beads woven into a
braided hairstyle, pursuant to a prohibition on jewelry in the workplace. See 27 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 698 (N.D. Ga. May 26, 1981).
43 In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the victim of discrimination
must show that she was treated differently than a similarly situated person on the basis of
her protected status as a woman or racial minority. Thus, the apparent gender similarities
with white women and race similarities with black men make demonstration of differential
treatment difficult to establish. For further examples of courts' failures to recognize inter-
sections of race and gender, see Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231; Carswell, 27 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. at 700; DeGraffenreid v. Gen. Motors Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp. 142,145 (E.D. Mo.
1976) (declining to recognize protected sub-category of "black women" with standing
independent of black males); cf. Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1562 (9th Cir. 1994)
(recognizing discrimination claim of Asian American female job applicant against hiring
committee favoring Asian American men).
44 See, e.g., Moore v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc., 708 F.2d 475, 480 (9th Cir. 1983)
(declaring that plaintiff black female inadequately represents white females' interests for
purposes of class certification). Similar phenomena occur in the intersection of gender
with sexuality, national origin with language ability, and alienage with race. The related
phenomena of "felon proxies," in which the characteristic of being a black male is substi-
tuted for criminal propensity on the basis of stereotypical associations, highlights another
problem arising from intersectional identity.
45 Professor Caldwell discusses the correlative assumptions of "race-sex correspon-
dence" and "race-sex independence or distinctiveness" in the law. Caldwell, supra note 41,
at 372-73; see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686, 688 (1973) (acknowledging
race-sex analogy and suggesting heightened scrutiny for gender that has since been labeled
"skeptical scrutiny"); 2 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA app. 5, at 1073-78
(Transaction Publishers 1996) (1944) (analogizing plight of blacks and women and com-
paring civil rights movement to women's rights movement); Serena Mayeri, Note, "A
Common Fate of Discrimination": Race-Gender Analogies in Legal and Historical Perspec-
tive, 110 YALE L.J. 1045 (2001); cf Deborah K. King, Multiple Jeopardy, Multiple Con-
sciousness: The Context of a Black Feminist Ideology, in FEMINIST THEORY IN PRACTICE
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According to intersectionality theory, the unity of two minority
traits constitutes in fact a distinct single-minority entity. While the
idea may seem novel, one can easily imagine the transformative power
of combining two component entities into an amalgamated whole in
other disciplines. In chemistry, for example, the individual elements
of hydrogen and oxygen combine to form the distinct substance of
water. In physics, the colors blue and yellow combine to produce the
distinct color green rather than a shade of blue or yellow. Similarly,
intersectionality theory proposes that two claims come together to
constitute a distinct claim. The force of intersectionality theorists'
claims is not limited to the particular combination of race and gender.
It may be extended to several combinations of identity, including race
and religion.
46
In each case, the crux of intersectionality is to recognize and
respond to the law's tendency to depress dual minorities in response
to their duality, rather than in response to either of their minority
characteristics alone. The resulting claim, which incorporates what
heretofore would have been separate causes of action, is fundamen-
tally different and thus merits stricter scrutiny on the basis of its
changed nature.
47
2. Intersectionality as a Justification for Hybridity
Intersectionality theory contributes to hybridity the insight that
dual-minority status results in a transformation of one's experience
under the law to a more depressed status. This matrix of oppression
experienced by dual minorities-be they black women, gay racial
minorities, disabled immigrants, or Muslims with dark skin and Arab
AND PROCESS 75 (Micheline R. Malson et al. eds., 1989) (providing feminist perspective on
strength of black women).
46 Though not evaluated under the paradigm of free exercise, a third example of inter-
sectionality may be seen in litigation brought to challenge the assumption that Chinese
immigrants in the 1800s were non-Christian and therefore were not competent to serve in
public office or proffer sworn testimony. See People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399, 404 (1854) (over-
turning murder conviction of free white citizen secured on testimony of Chinese witnesses
because "[tihe same rule which would admit [Chinese] to testify, would admit them to all
the equal rights of citizenship, and we might soon see them at the polls, in the jury box,
upon the bench, and in our legislative halls").
47 While this Note focuses on the legal claims that a dual minority would need to make
under a reinterpretation of hybridity, it is interesting to consider the implications of this
argument for the remedies sought by that dual minority. Presumably, if the two claims
considered jointly are transformed into a fundamentally different sort of claim, the
resulting claim presumably is indivisible insofar as it cannot easily be redivided into its
component parts. While the dual minority may not be barred from claiming recovery
under the race and religion causes of action as an initial matter, the implication of the
analysis seems to be that success on a hybrid claim would preclude further litigation or
recovery on either of the component claims.
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ancestry-requires corrective action if these dual minorities are to
enjoy comparable rights to their single-minority counterparts. If dual
minorities occupy a lower legal status than their majority counter-
parts, and even their single-minority counterparts, extraordinary judi-
cial protection is required for them to enjoy comparable rights. While
obtaining a legal status comparable to single minorities still may fall
short of the legal protection afforded to majorities, dual minorities
nonetheless move crucially closer to full protection insofar as the law
provides them with a fighting chance of vindicating their claims in
court. In an era when intentional discrimination is harder and harder
to prove, this increased leverage is indispensable to obtaining equal
protections and preserving equal freedoms under law.
3. Doctrinal Examples of the Logic of Hybridity
Rooted in the tradition of critical race theory, the jurisprudential
logic of intersectionality theory is not only cohesive, as shown above,
but it also is supported by several elements of mainstream legal anal-
ysis. Placed in the context of such mainstream jurisprudence, the rein-
terpretation of hybridity in terms of intersectionality theory emerges
as a legitimate and applicable proposal.
a. Suspect Classifications
The suspect classification strand of equal protection jurispru-
dence, in which the state bears the burden of justifying legislation that
singles out groups laden with a history of discrimination, supports the
notion that the assertion of multiple rights under the Constitution
necessitates a heightened level of judicial scrutiny.
Thus, in Plyler v. Doe, Justice Brennan's majority opinion
declared a Texas statute denying children of immigrants access to
public education to be unconstitutional. 48 In the course of his deci-
sion, he explained that strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard of
judicial review because the challenged scheme implicated both the
suspect class of national origin-albeit unintentionally-and impinged
on the exercise of a fundamental right.49 With regard to the suspect
classification, he explained, "Some classifications are more likely than
others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative ration-
ality in pursuit of some legitimate objective."' 0 While the differential
48 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982).
49 Id. at 216-17 & nn.14-15. In Plyler, Justice Brennan notes that the Court has
"treated as presumptively invidious those classifications that disadvantage a 'suspect class,'
or that impinge upon the exercise of a 'fundamental right."' Id. at 216-17 (citations
omitted).
50 Id. at 216 n.14.
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impact of the Texas policy on education of immigrant children did not
by itself merit heightened scrutiny without proof of an invidious
intent, Justice Brennan explained that a compelling interest was nev-
ertheless necessary: "In determining whether a class-based denial of a
particular right is deserving of strict scrutiny under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, we look to the Constitution to see if the right infringed
has its source, explicitly or implicitly, therein. ' 51 Since San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez already had clarified that
education, although important, was not by itself a "fundamental right"
worthy of strict scrutiny,52 Brennan portends that proper application
of the test in Rodriguez would weigh the assertion of two claims
arising under the Constitution more heavily than the assertion of
either right alone-a logic remarkably similar to that described in free
exercise and in the equality rationale for hybridity.
b. Fundamental Rights
Though based on a distinct clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Supreme Court's due process case Skinner v. Oklahoma similarly
held that the level of scrutiny accorded certain statutory classifications
depends not only on the classification itself, but also on how "funda-
mental" the affected interest is. 53 These two considerations necessi-
tated strict scrutiny when viewed together rather than individually-
much the same way as would be required under hybridity.
In Skinner, the Court applied strict scrutiny to an Oklahoma
statute mandating the sterilization of "habitual criminals" because it
so intimately affected one of the basic civil rights of man-procrea-
tion-and because Oklahoma's ability to sterilize its citizens could
have devastating effects for a racial minority group (again, absent
intent to target such a group). 54 Therefore, the Court felt duty bound
51 Id. at 217 n.15.
52 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In Rodriguez, a case substantially similar to Plyler, Justice Powell
denied strict scrutiny to African American plaintiffs alleging the unconstitutionality of a
school financing system. See 411 U.S. at 18 (1973). In contrast to the outright denial of
education asserted in Plyler, plaintiffs in Rodriguez asserted that an educational financing
scheme yielding inadequate education for minority students merited strict scrutiny.
Claiming that plaintiffs lacked a fundamental right to a specified quality of education and
thus asserted only one colorable claim under the Constitution, alongside their claim of
equal protection, Justice Powell refused to apply strict scrutiny. Id. at 37. Powell's concur-
rence in Plyler distinguishes his findings in Rodriguez and argues that heightened scrutiny,
though not strict scrutiny, was appropriate for children of illegal aliens. See Plyler, 457
U.S. at 238-40 & 239 nn.2-3 (Powell, J., concurring).
53 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
54 Id. at 541.
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to apply stricter scrutiny when legislation infringed both fundamental
liberty and equal protection of suspect classifications. 55
c. Discrete and Insular Minorities
Under established equal protection jurisprudence, special protec-
tions are afforded to discrete and insular minorities, as defined in the
famed footnote four of the Court's decision in United States v.
Carolene Products Co. 56 The rationale for this special protection is
that these distinct types of minorities are distinguishable from the gen-
eral, so to speak, minority. Thus, the dual minority's distinct position
in society places him or her squarely within the discrete and insular
class. For example, the dual religious and racial minority is distinct
from religious minority groups and racial minority groups in two
senses: Their experiences in society are insufficiently similar to other
groups in society and are thus "discrete, '57 and their experiences in
55 The Supreme Court's subsequent cases, which suggest that marriage may not consti-
tute a fundamental right worthy of due process protection, may be thought to weaken the
analogy presented above. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376, 388-89
(1971) (marking the high point for the Court's consideration of marriage as fundamental
right). However, the legal analysis presented in Skinner illustrates the Court's continuing
acceptance of hybrid styles of reasoning, notwithstanding subsequent changes in the
Court's weighting of one particular right used to form part of a hybrid claim. The same is
true of Rodriguez, in which Justice Powell modeled a hybrid style of reasoning in the equal
protection context, despite subsequent determinations that education may not constitute a
fundamental right. 411 U.S. at 40; see also supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
56 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Also instructive is the Court's decision in West Virginia
Board of Education v. Barnette, in which the Court wrote that
[t]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majori-
ties and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the
courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press,
freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.
319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
57 Consonant with the view that religious minorities are discrete are the views of sev-
eral prominent academics that religion should be analyzed within the paradigm of equal
protection developed in association with racial justice movements. For example, Michael
McConnell, who was formerly a law professor and since has served as a federal appeals
court judge, argues that religion cannot and should not be separated from antidiscrimina-
tion law pertaining to protected classes such as race. See generally Michael W. McConnell,
Religion and Constitutional Rights: Why Is Religious Liberty the "First Freedom"?, 21 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 1243 (2000). Professors Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager have
extended this reasoning a step further in an influential article proposing that free exercise
be analyzed in accordance with the values of equal protection. See Christopher L.
Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis
for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245 (1994) (arguing that free exer-
cise is best understood as protecting vulnerable groups rather than privileging particular
acts or beliefs and that religious believers are uniquely vulnerable to being ignored or
misunderstood by outside bodies because they proceed from idiosyncratic and often inac-
cessible epistemological assumptions). Such views interpret the religion clauses as func-
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politics are weakened by an inability to influence public debate and
inspire protective legislation, and thus are considered "insular. ' 58
Though not binding authority, Justice Blackmun's observation in
Smith II is consistent with the Court's prior descriptions of discrete
and insular minorities. Justice Blackmun decried the majority's asser-
tion that the Court has rejected or declined to apply the compelling
interest test in its recent cases.59 He declared, "I do not believe the
Founders thought their dearly bought freedom from religious persecu-
tion a 'luxury,' but an essential element of liberty-and they could not
have thought religious intolerance 'unavoidable,' for they drafted the
Religion Clauses precisely in order to avoid that intolerance.
'60
Along similar lines, Justice O'Connor expressly referenced the polit-
ical powerlessness of religious minorities in her concurrence to Smith
II: "[T]he First Amendment was enacted precisely to protect the
rights of those whose religious practices are not shared by the majority
and may be viewed with hostility. The history of our free exercise
tioning primarily to prevent preferential treatment among different faiths. Compare these
views with interpretations of the religion clauses as functioning primarily to protect volun-
tariness of faith as a matter of liberty. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1160 (1988) ("What emerges from the Court's examination of his-
tory is a pair of fundamental principles ... animating the first amendment: voluntarism
and separatism .... [Voluntarism means that] the advancement of a church would come
only from the voluntary support of its followers and not from the political support of the
state.").
58 The academic literature contains a vibrant debate about whether religious argument
is and ought to be excluded from political debate. See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE
CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS
DEVOTION (1993) (advocating for greater religious voice in public debate); STEPHEN L.
CARTER, GOD'S NAME IN VAIN: THE WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF RELIGION IN POLITICS
(2000) (same); E.J. Dionne Jr. & John J. Dilulio Jr., God and the American Experiment.
An Introduction, in WHAT'S GOD GOT TO Do WITH THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT? 1, 13
(E.J. Dionne Jr. & John J. Dilulio Jr. eds., 2000) (asserting that "God and arguments about
God will always have a great deal to do with the American experiment"); Kent
Greenawalt, Religious Expression in the Public Square-The Building Blocks for an Inter-
mediate Position, 29 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 1411 (1996) (cautiously approving of religious
discourse in public life); Ruti Teitel, A Critique of Religion as Politics in the Public Sphere,
78 CORNELL L. REV. 747, 748 (1993) (describing and critiquing "movement towards a
greater intermingling of politics and religion"). For a recent example of this debate playing
out in the context of the debate over the propriety of government aid to faith-based chari-
ties, see SACRED PLACES, CIVIC PURPOSES: SHOULD GOVERNMENT HELP FAITH-BASED
CHARITY? (E.J. Dionne Jr. & Ming Hsu Chen eds., 2001).
59 Justice Blackmun, rejecting the majority opinion, claimed that the "'constitutional
anomaly"' is the view that laws can never give way to claims of free exercise, not that they
might be a "'luxury"' that cannot be afforded in a "well-ordered society." Smith II, 494
U.S. at 908-09 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion in Smith I, 494 U.S. at
886 & 880).
60 Id.; see also infra text accompanying note 76.
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doctrine amply demonstrates the harsh impact majoritarian rule has
had on unpopular or emerging religious groups.
'61
That Justices O'Connor and Blackmun spoke of free exercise in
the language of equality is not coincidental. Despite continuing
debate over the original purposes of the Free Exercise Clause,
scholars mostly agree as a descriptive matter that the religion clauses
of the Constitution underwent a revolution during the Warren Court
era such that they have come to stand for an equality principle ever
since.62 As a result of this revolutionary reinterpretation, the Free
Exercise Clause has become a legal hook for ensuring that religious
minorities obtain equal treatment under the law.63
61 Smith H, 494 U.S. at 902 (O'Connor, J., concurring). For further support of Justice
O'Connor's interpretation of footnote four of Carolene Products, see, for example, JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 75-77, 86-87 (1980) (setting forth influential
variant on political process rationale in footnote four); Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A
Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1103 (1982) (providing
insider's view of footnote four genesis and meaning); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Prod-
ucts Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1089 (1982) (summarizing footnote four argument
for strict scrutiny judicial review of minority rights as being judicial correction of defective
democratic process disabling discrete and insular minorities); cf Bruce A. Ackerman,
Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 742 (1985) (contending that diffuse and
anonymous minority groups such as women, poor people, and gays also may qualify for
strict scrutiny given their inability to influence political process).
Professor Abner Greene presents an innovative argument that religious exemptions
may be required to compensate for the structural disadvantages religions suffer in politics
as a result of the Establishment Clause, which disables them from using religious argu-
ments as a basis for legislation. See Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion
Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611, 1613 (1993). Compare this view with Justice Scalia's counter-
argument in Smith H that religious minorities have been able to access the legislature, as
evidenced by the fact that "a number of States have made an exception to their drug laws
for sacramental peyote use" and that even if "leaving accommodation to the political pro-
cess will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely
engaged in.. . [this is an] unavoidable consequence of democratic government." Smith II,
494 U.S. at 890.
62 See generally Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: Transformation of the Estab-
lishment Clause, 90 CAL. L. REV. 673, 676 (2002) (arguing Establishment Clause is prop-
erly rooted in liberty principles but underwent metamorphosis to equality principles during
Warren era). While the original intent of the religion clauses remains disputed, see supra
note 57, the contemporary state of free exercise jurisprudence has binding effect notwith-
standing its faithfulness to legal history. This contemporary understanding thus provides
relevant background for this Note about dual minorities. Further support for this
approach can be found in Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in School District of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). Brennan writes that "[a] too literal
quest for the advice of the Founding Fathers ... seems to me futile and misdirected ....
[T]he historical record is at best ambiguous," id. at 237, and that "our religious composi-
tion makes us a vastly more diverse people than our forefathers .... [They] knew differ-
ences chiefly among Protestant sects," id. at 240.
63 This perception of religious minorities as posing an equality concern that can be
dealt with best through a heightened level of protection may be contrasted with the view
that diversity creates an administrative problem that requires more stringent regulations to
avoid increasing demands on government. After all, in any given situation where two par-
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The foregoing analogies to suspect classification and due process
jurisprudence illustrate that the joint consideration of typically distinct
claim types is not without precedent in constitutional law. However,
the analogies offered should not be taken as an argument that either
the Equal Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment should be relied on directly and exclusively as
recourse for free exercise rights.64 The claims of dual minorities are
distinct from both free exercise and equal protection analyses as con-
ventionally understood. But dual minorities continue to occupy a dis-
tinct legal posture from those who assert claims exclusively under
either the Equal Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause. Thus,
when courts speak about combined claims of religious and racial dis-
crimination in terms of free exercise or equal protection alone, they
miss the fundamental point: Hybridization of religion and race trans-
forms these joined claims into something that is distinct from both.
Without endorsing either equal protection or due process jurispru-
dence as the primary justification for hybrid analysis, this Note adopts
intersectionality theory as the primary justification.65
ties are treated differently, equality may be obtained by either raising the level of treat-
ment afforded to one or lowering the level of treatment for the other. While Justices
Blackmun, O'Connor, and Harlan take the former view, Justice Scalia takes the latter. In
Smith II, Justice Scalia states that exempting religious minorities would be "courting
anarchy" and that this danger "increases in direct proportion to the society's diversity of
religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none of them." 494 U.S. at
888. Rather than viewing diversity as a strength, he writes,
Precisely because "we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost
every conceivable religious preference," and precisely because we value and
protect that religious divergence, we cannot afford the luxury of deeming pre-
sumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of con-
duct that does not protect an interest of the highest order.
Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961)).
64 Notice that the given examples lack the requisite intent element to independently
trigger strict scrutiny under either conventional equal protection jurisprudence or pre-
Smith II free exercise jurisprudence.
65 Moreover, framing hybrid discrimination in terms of equal protection is especially
problematic because the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects
primarily against "class or caste treatment" of historically subjugated groups with immu-
table identity characteristics. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982). In contrast, the
paradigmatic cases of Arab American Muslims discussed in this Note are ideological and
hence more consistent with the theoretical underpinnings of the religion clauses than with
the underpinnings of the Equal Protection Clause.
Contemporary commentators make a similar point in analogizing sexuality to religion
rather than race on the belief that it is significantly voluntary and expressive of ideology.
See, e.g., DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, WOMEN, GAYS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 354-70 (1998)
(arguing that sexuality should be treated as suspect classification, in manner of gender,
race, and religion, given that each characteristic is immutable, based on irrational stereo-
type, and historically disfavored, and that each group is politically powerless); Jack M.
Battaglia, Religion, Sexual Orientation, and Self-Realization: First Amendment Principles
and Anti-Discrimination Laws, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 189 (1999) (discussing connec-
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This Note references equal protection and due process jurispru-
dence merely to set forth a plausible interpretation of the hybridity
doctrine developed in Smith H. Notwithstanding these cautionary
notes, the pairing of religion and race under the Constitution makes
intuitive as well as doctrinal sense.
III
HYBRIDITY RECONTEXTUALIZED:
DUAL MINORITIES AND ARAB AMERICAN MUSLIMS
Part II endorsed an interpretation of hybridity that draws on
intersectionality theory's insights that dual minorities are qualitatively
different in ways protected by the equality dimensions of free exercise
and therefore worthy of heightened scrutiny. Part III espouses the
special relevance of hybridity for dual minorities seeking identity-
based exemptions from laws of general application. Specifically, Part
III recontextualizes hybridity as understood in Part II in order to illu-
minate the distinctive claims brought by dual minorities in two
common circumstances: religious minorities' petitions for exemption
from government-sponsored dress regulations in order to wear relig-
ious garments, and religious minorities' petitions for accommodation
of religious symbols in government-sponsored holiday displays. By
comparing the legal analysis that would pertain to their claims under
traditional and revised notions of hybridity, Part III highlights the
important differences that such a reinterpretation achieves for dual
minorities' distinct challenges under constitutional law. While steeped
in the language of hybridity promisingly introduced in Smith H, this
Part builds on dicta in Smith H and the insights of intersectionality
theory in order to sketch a comprehensive legal strategy that may be
employed by Arab American Muslims.
A. Exemptions for Religious Garments
In Goldman v. Weinberger,66 the Supreme Court denied a Jewish
soldier's request for exemption from uniform dress codes that prohib-
ited him from wearing a yarmulke in accordance with the dictates of
his faith.67 Applying a deferential standard of review,68 the Court
tion between "self-realization," religion, and sexual orientation); David B. Cruz, Disestab-
lishing Sex and Gender, 90 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1005-27 (2002) (arguing that gender and sex
are "disestablished" in Constitution and analogizing disestablishment to treatment of
religion).
66 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
67 Id. at 504.
68 Id. at 506 ("'[T]he military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from
civilian society."' (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974))). Compare Justice
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held that the military officials' determination appropriately distin-
guished exceptions for "religious apparel that is visible and that which
is not" 69 and were properly within the province of "professional judg-
ment. '70 Judicial questioning as to whether accouterments "create a
'clear danger' of undermining discipline and esprit de corps" were
"beside the point."
'71
Concurring, Justice Stevens acknowledged that while Captain
Goldman presented "an especially attractive case for an exception
from the uniform regulations, '72 the test of the regulations must con-
sider how it would apply to "all service personnel who have sincere
religious beliefs that may conflict with one or more military com-
mands. ' 73 On this basis, Stevens suggested that permitting religious
exemptions from dress regulations inevitably would lead to unequal
treatment among faiths. Officials would be unlikely to permit a "rag-
tag band of soldiers" clothed in accouterments from various religious
faiths, even though they might be willing to permit the lone yarmulke.
Quoting Justice Brennan's dissent, Stevens perceptively noted, "The
very strength of Captain Goldman's claim creates the danger that a
similar claim on behalf of a Sikh or a Rastafarian might readily be
dismissed as 'so extreme, so unusual, or so faddish an image that
public confidence in his ability to perform his duties will be
destroyed."' 74 Rather than risk this danger, Stevens would have all
soldiers restricted to the same uniform without regard for the gar-
ments or symbols that their faith may require of them.
In a dissenting opinion that most closely approximates the senti-
ments in this Note, Justice Blackmun disavowed the notion that a fair
distinction may be drawn between Jewish soldiers desiring to wear a
yarmulke and Sikhs desiring to carry sacramental weapons or wear
beards. Unlike Justice Brennan and like Justice Stevens, Blackmun
worried that the disparate treatment of Orthodox Jews and Sikhs
Brennan's view of the need for higher scrutiny when individual liberties are at stake. Id. at
515 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("While we have hesitated [to intervene], due to our lack of
expertise concerning military affairs and our respect for the delegated authority of a coor-
dinate branch .... we have never abdicated our obligation of judicial review.").
69 Id. at 510.
70 Id. at 509.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 510.
73 Id. at 512; see also id. at 503 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring) (characterizing question
presented as "'[w]hether the Air Force may constitutionally prohibit an Orthodox Jewish
psychologist from wearing a "yarmulke" ... while he is in uniform on duty at a military
hospital"' rather than narrower question of whether valid general prohibition is impermis-
sible as applied to petitioner (quoting Brief for the Petitioner at i, Goldman (No. 84-
1097)).
74 Id. at 512 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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would be unconstitutional, regardless of whether it would be "more
troublesome or unfair than the existing neutral standard. '75 Unlike
Justice Stevens, however, Blackmun saw this as a reason to permit
more exemptions from military dress codes rather than less. He inter-
preted the military's disputed policy to incidentally burden less estab-
lished minority religions to a greater extent than more established
faiths; indeed, Blackmun understood the policy to encourage such dif-
ferential treatment. Not only would established faiths "receive special
treatment under such an approach; they would receive special treat-
ment precisely because they are conventional. '76
Justice Blackmun's concern implicitly speaks to the danger that
minority faiths plagued with multiple dimensions of unconventionality
would suffer unequally-whether because they are small, recently
developed, or practiced predominantly by nonmainstream groups. As
such, Blackmun's argument intuits that dual minorities are qualita-
tively different from single minorities. Without using the terms "dual
minority" or "intersectionality," Justice Blackmun recognized that
recently-immigrated or darker-skinned religious minorities such as
Sikhs suffer from multiple dimensions of "unconventionality." Conse-
quently, they stand in a different place, not merely a relatively worse
place, than single minorities such as white Muslims or more estab-
lished minority practitioners such as the Jews or the Amish.
The debate in Goldman is thus prescient: It anticipates contem-
porary debates over the propriety of Arab American Muslims and
Sikhs seeking permission to wear religious symbols and clothing oth-
erwise banned from public spaces and discouraged in private spaces
such as airports. The very types of claims that the Goldman Court
worried would ensue in their parade of horribles now are being
pressed in courts nationwide. 77
75 Id. at 522; see also Sasnett v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corr., 197 F.3d 290, 292 (7th Cir.
1999) (Posner, C.J.) (noting in dicta that "[n]othing in Smith authorizes the government to
pick and choose between religions without any justification"). In Sasnett, Posner decried a
prison regulation that would allow crosses to be worn when attached to rosaries, but not
otherwise, since the addition of a string of beads that could be used for strangulation
makes the ensemble more dangerous rather than less. "The prison authorities opined that
Protestants . . . could simply ignore [the rosary] and concentrate on the cross, but this
shows a complete ignorance of religious feeling. One might as well tell Anglicans to kiss
the Pope's ring but pretend he's the Archbishop of Canterbury." Id. at 293.
76 Goldman, 475 U.S. at 527 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
77 See, e.g., Chowdhury v. Northwest Airlines, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(challenging practice at Northwest Airlines of denying passage to American citizens whose
names bear similarities to names on FBI watch list after September 11). See also infra
sources referenced in note 79 for more examples of litigation brought by Arab American
Muslims since September 11.
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Under the theory of this Note, a Sikh or Arab American Muslim
challenging an airport "dress code" limiting the adornment of jewelry,
symbols, or clothing may be able to make out a hybrid claim. The
claim would assert colorably (1) that such a policy unduly burdens
adherents' free exercise of Islam or Sikhism, and (2) that it draws dis-
tinctions that more heavily impact members of a protected class on
the basis of their race, color, national origin, or religion. The combi-
nation of the claims would trigger strict scrutiny such that the govern-
ment would have to make out a compelling justification for its policy
and demonstrate that the policy is narrowly tailored to that end.78 To
the extent that perceived, rather than actual, security threats motivate
the government distinctions, dual minorities have an enhanced posi-
tion over the Jewish soldier in Goldman because a searching judicial
inquiry into the alleged threat and the proposed governmental action
would be required. More to the point, dual minorities also would be
in a better position than the similarly-situated individuals claiming
exemption from a generally applicable federal law in the post-
September 11 context.79 Their odds of prevailing in this hypothetical
example, drawn from Goldman and closely approximating the
78 As in the actual cases, the commercial airlines referenced in the situations described
infra note 79 are substantially regulated by the Federal Aviation Administration and the
dictates of the Constitution due to their reliance on federal funding for their institution of
publicly funded security clearance procedures and their use of personnel from agencies
such as the Transportation Security Administration.
79 Numerous instances of these types of incidents, colloquially termed "flying while
brown," have been documented and considered for legal challenge. See, e.g., Susan M.
Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After September 11,
2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295, 299 (2002) ("A
complex matrix of 'otherness' based on race, national origin, religion, culture, and political
ideology may contribute to the ferocity of the U.S. government's attacks on the civil rights
of Arabs and Muslims [after September 11]."); Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Note, Flying
While Brown: Federal Civil Rights Remedies to Post-9/11 Airline Racial Profiling of South
Asians, 10 ASIAN L. J. 215 (2003) (describing use of racial profiling in aviation security and
examining legal redress available to profiled passengers); see generally COUNCIL ON AMER-
ICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS RESEARCH CTR., AMERICAN MUSLIMS: ONE YEAR AFTER 9-11
(Sept. 5, 2002), available at http://www.cair-net.org/downloads/911report.pdf; MICHAEL S.
LEE, ARAB AMERICAN INST., HEALING THE NATION: THE ARAB AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, available at http://www.aaiusa.org/PDF/healing-the-nation.pdf (last
visited Apr. 6, 2004); NAT'L ASIAN PAC. AM. LEGAL CONSORTIUM, BACKLASH: WHEN
AMERICA TURNED ON ITS OWN, A PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE 2001 AUDIT OF VIO-
LENCE AGAINST ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICANS, available at http://www.napalc.org/literature/
annual report/Post9_11.pdf (requires passcode "napback9ll") (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
While the nature of the grievances alleged in these types of cases may resonate with equal
protection analysis, they are analyzed under the Free Exercise Clause. This is because the
Free Exercise Clause presents a plausible cause of action, whereas settled interpretations
of the Equal Protection Clause posit that causes of action must demonstrate intentional
discrimination and longstanding historical discrimination against the protected class in
order to be legally cognizable.
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analysis of Wisconsin v. Yoder 80 appearing in Smith H, ostensibly
would be stronger under a hybridity analysis than existing tests. The
example does not show that the dual minority who seeks exemption
due to his Amish, Sikh, Muslim, or Jewish religious practices will win,
but merely that he could win. A court hearing such a case can weigh
carefully the competing interests in reaching its own decision whether
to grant or deny an exemption.
B. Accommodation of Religious Displays
Another arena in which dual minorities have demanded special
consideration from government is in the erection of religious displays.
For example, in Allegheny v. ACLU, the Supreme Court responded to
plaintiffs' challenges to a holiday display that included Christian and
Jewish symbols. 81 The Court held unconstitutional a freestanding dis-
play of a nativity scene on the main staircase of a county courthouse
that was not surrounded by secular Christmas decorations, but it
upheld the display of a Jewish Chanukah menorah placed next to a
Christmas tree and a sign saying "Salute to Liberty" in a public
building one block away from the courthouse.
Utilizing a nonendorsement analysis under the Establishment
Clause, the Court reasoned that the nativity scene unaccompanied by
reindeer and Santa Claus figures suggested that the government took
a position on a question of religious belief that related to a person's
"'standing in the political community." 82 A different majority rea-
soned that the menorah display, in contrast, conveyed a message that
was not "exclusively religious," but rather conveyed a message of
"pluralism and freedom of belief during the holiday season. ' 83
While Allegheny technically arose under the Establishment
Clause, rather than the Free Exercise Clause, its facts still may be used
to illustrate the core themes of this Note. Throughout its fractured
opinions in this and other creche cases, the Court assumed that
Christmas and Chanukah, while not entirely secular, possessed a
80 406 U.S. 205 (1972). For more information about the Yoder case, see infra note 85.
81 492 U.S. 573 (1989); cf Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984) (permitting City
of Pawtucket to purchase and exhibit creche display and declining to take absolutist view
of religion clauses on grounds that such view would discourage "diversity and pluralism").
In Lynch, Justice Brennan protested that the nativity scene, unlike every other element of
the display, conveyed to minority religious groups a message "that their views are not
similarly worthy of public recognition nor entitled to public support" and inflicted "insult
and an injury" not countenanced by the religion clauses. Id. at 701, 709 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
82 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 625 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at
687 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
83 Id. at 635.
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''secular dimension" consistent with the tradition and history of the
American people. 84 While this view may seem amenable to religious
minorities and may not be obviously discriminatory-since it protects
Judaism-the embedded test of tradition or conventionality is insid-
ious. The test inevitably disadvantages marginalized minority reli-
gions that have, for a variety of reasons, not assimilated to the
mainstream.85
The Court prescribed a de facto limiting principle by reference to
religious minority groups who do not share the same length of history
or level of acceptance that Jews (or the Amish) have achieved. As the
Court expressed in Yoder and implied in Goldman and Allegheny,
part of the test for exemption is whether a religious minority has
demonstrated the adequacy of its alternative mode of living "in terms
of precisely those overall interests that the State advances. '86 Even if
some minority groups such as the Amish may be able to make this sort
84 Justices Blackmun and Kennedy expressed a belief that Christmas and Chanukah
had secular components. To Blackmun,
[T]he relevant question ... is whether the combined display of the tree, the
sign, and the menorah has the effect of endorsing both Christian and Jewish
faiths, or rather simply acknowledges that both Christmas and Chanukah are
part of the same winter-holiday season, which has attained a secular status in
our society.
Id. at 616 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also id. at 664 (declaring creche and menorah
displays permissible, noncoercive accommodation of religious faith and "purely passive
symbols of religious holidays") (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in
part). In Lynch, the Court noted that
[t]here is an unbroken history of official acknowledgment . . . of the role of
religion in American life .... Our history is replete with official references to
the value and invocation of Divine guidance ... [by] the Founding Fathers and
contemporary leaders .... Presidents and ... the Congress have proclaimed
both Christmas and Thanksgiving National Holidays.
465 U.S. at 674-76.
85 In further illustration of this point, similar logic is employed in the Smith H
majority's attempt to distinguish the granting of an exemption from compulsory education
laws to Amish parents on the basis of free exercise from the denial of Native Americans'
request for exemption from drug laws so that they could smoke peyote in ceremonies. In
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 224-26 (1972), the Court praised the industry and pro-
ductivity of Amish traditions and acknowledged the pedagogical merit to their alternative
education system. The Court emphasized that "we are not dealing with a way of life and
mode of education by a group claiming to have recently discovered some 'progressive' or
more enlightened process for rearing children for modern life." Id. at 235. Rather, the
Court declared, "[a]ided by a history of three centuries ... and a long history as a suc-
cessful and self-sufficient segment of American society," the Amish
have convincingly demonstrated the sincerity of their religious beliefs, the
interrelationship of belief with their mode of life, the vital role that belief and
daily conduct play in the continual survival of Old Order Amish communities
and their religious organization, and the hazards presented by the State's
enforcement of a statute generally valid as to others.
Id.
86 Id.
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of showing, the Court notes that "probably few other religious groups
or sects could make" such a showing.87 One only can surmise that
Arab American Muslims likely are not among them.
One could theorize that, under Allegheny, if a group of black
Muslims desired that the government put up another holiday display
consisting of the Nation of Islam's crescent moon emblem, quotations
from Malcolm X about the importance of faith for the empowerment
of black men, and a Kwanzaa candle, it would not pass the "unbroken
history" test. Yet it would possess a secular dimension such that it
ought to satisfy the anti-endorsement test.
Under the hybridity analysis set forth in this Note, the black
Muslim seeking accommodation of the above-described holiday dis-
play has a colorable case: Permission for such a display would
advance his right to free exercise and would convey a message to
black nationalists that they stand equal to all others before the gov-
ernment in the same way that the nativity scene did in Lynch and the
menorah did in Allegheny.
A court may counter that the Nation of Islam's symbols are anti-
thetical to inclusion because they bespeak racial separatism. But to
the extent that these ideas are inextricably tied to the religious ide-
ology condemned by the government, the doctrine of hybridity would
trigger strict scrutiny so that a court would have to justify its prohibi-
tion against the individual's asserted rights. A court might weigh the
balance of free exercise against the government's interest in
preventing violence of the sort that led to the assassination of
Malcolm X and Martin Luther King. More likely, however, such an
interest would be deemed rational or even important, but not compel-
ling, and such a prohibition would not be deemed narrowly tailored to
the goal of stilling violence.
Admittedly, the Court's recently fluctuating stance towards
imposing affirmative obligations on government actors for the sake of
obtaining substantive equality in higher education,88 contracting, 89
87 Id. at 236.
88 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (upholding principle of diver-
sity as compelling interest for affirmative action programs in higher education); Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 271-72, 319-20 (1978) (upholding possibility of
affirmative action in higher education but striking down specific program using quotas as
violative of Equal Protection Clause); Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 274, 275 & n.66
(5th Cir. 2000) (striking down principle of diversity as compelling interest for affirmative
action and criticizing Bakke as nonmajority opinion).
89 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (striking down affirma-
tive action in contracting).
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voting,90 and other contexts may weaken the likelihood that similar
free exercise claims would succeed for reasons independent of the
hybridity analysis described herein. At the very least, however, a dual
minority in the examples described would obtain a more exacting
standard of review. Under this exacting standard of review, he may
insist that the government carry its burden of establishing narrowly
tailored means of achieving a compelling interest before it infringes
on his rights. Accordingly, while each of his colorable claims once
may not even have survived preliminary motion practice-his free
exercise exemption claim because of the Scylla of deferential review
obtained in Smith II and his equal protection claim because of the
Charybdis of disparate impact without intent-his claims now would
be heard together on their merits. These hybrid claims would be
assessed for their cumulative and distinctive effects on the plaintiff. In
this way, a dual minority plaintiff would avoid the Scylla and
Charybdis posed by current equal protection and free exercise juris-
prudence and obtain a forum in which his distinct harms may be
redressed.
CONCLUSION:
Two WRONGS MAKE A RIGHT
Numerous questions remain that are beyond the scope of this
Note, or that require further litigation as an antecedent to further the-
orizing. One issue, however, seems worth noting and responding to
here for the purpose of both clarifying and defending the doctrine of
hybridity as it has been interpreted throughout this Note-the case of
a plaintiff who claims free exercise rights without also being able to
allege a protected status under the Equal Protection Clause.
As a matter of formal logic, it would appear that a white plaintiff,
for example a white evangelical Christian, ought to be able to qualify
for strict scrutiny under the hybridity doctrine if a minority plaintiff
claiming free exercise rights qualifies. Otherwise, the two individuals
appear to stand unequal before the law in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, or at least in violation of norms of fairness and equity.
90 See, e.g., Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003) (upholding principle of influence
districting when race of voters is considered under § 5 of Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973 (2000)); Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241 (2001) (approving affirmative action
in redistricting for goal of increasing minority representation, so long as race is not "pre-
dominant" factor); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993) (finding appellants stated claim
under Equal Protection Clause by alleging North Carolina's redistricting plan was irration-
ally and unjustifiably designed "to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of
their race").
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
May 2004]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Throughout, this Note has endeavored to offer principled justifi-
cations rather than merely strategic ones. Even in the apparently
troubling comparison of the white versus black adherents of the same
minority faith, a principled justification exists. If we are to take seri-
ously the insights from intersectionality theory, we must admit that
the single-minority plaintiff (for example, a white convert to Islam)
and the dual-minority plaintiff (for example, an Arab American
Muslim) stand in substantially different places before the law. The
claim of the Arab American Muslim is not quantitatively stronger than
that of his white counterpart just because he alleges two claims rather
than one. Nor is it possible to measure the additional leverage
brought to bear by race as if in a scientific experiment that holds
religion constant and lets race vary. The point of intersectionality
theory, and the point of this Note, is to recognize that the two litigants
stand in qualitatively different places. Comparing them in the manner
described above is to compare apples with oranges and to overlook
the key insight from intersectionality theory.
It nonetheless may be troubling that the white plaintiff cannot
vindicate his religious rights with more than rational review. How-
ever, we must consider the source of this trouble. Under the core
holding of Smith I-that all religious practitioners seeking exemp-
tions from generally applicable, neutral laws merit rational review-
the white plaintiff appropriately obtains rational review for his free
exercise claim. Notwithstanding any of its flaws, Smith II remains
good law. Thus, the position of the white litigant is controlled by the
status quo ante, or the holding in Smith I. As the Smith II Court
notes, the white litigant is free to seek congressional override by lob-
bying his congressman for a legislated exception to the policy that
brought about his claim and imposed a burden on his religious prac-
tice. Whether or not he can succeed in doing so thus is left to politics,
assuming once again that he does not belong to the rare "discrete and
insular minority" that cannot fairly be expected to utilize the legisla-
tive process.
It is true that hybridity may not benefit everyone equally or bol-
ster free exercise jurisprudence categorically. But that is not its goal.
Rather than advocating that Smith II be overturned, it endeavors to
present a principled legal means by which dual minorities-including,
but not limited to racial and religious minorities such as Arab Amer-
ican Muslims-may obtain strict scrutiny and preserve the possibility
of receiving exemptions under the law. Under the theory of this Note,
the dual-minority litigant would trigger the hybridity exception in
Smith II if he presents colorable claims under the Free Exercise and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution. After clearing this
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threshold, he would trigger strict scrutiny, or an opportunity to have
the government policy in question be justified stringently and
according to the dictates of the compelling-interest and narrow-
tailoring requirements. This heightened scrutiny is justified norma-
tively and legally by the transformation of the Free Exercise Clause to
include equality values and the social reality of the ways race and
religion can combine to form discrete and insular minorities.
While not a cure-all for religious freedom, the revision and robust
application of the doctrine of hybridity articulated in this Note can
help some of the most disadvantaged-those least able to effectuate
legal change through the traditional means of democracy and the
courts-to preserve their claims. The irony of the strategy suggested
by this Note may be that it subverts any hidden purpose of the Court
to deny religious minorities liberty and the protection of law by taking
seriously the Court's stated aims of encouraging uniform rules of law
and compliance by all, especially disfavored minorities. After all, if
the hybridity exception is integrated into the jurisprudential vision of
the Court, it ought to be available to all, not only to the Amish and
other religious minorities who have gained favor over time, but also to
newer dual minorities.
The doctrine of hybridity may not right what many consider to be
the ultimate wrong fashioned by the revolutionary jurisprudence of
Smith I. But it does take two so-called wrongs inflicted upon minori-
ties and transforms them into a right of action against the government.
Thus, where hybrid claims of religious and racial discrimination are
concerned, two wrongs do make a right.
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